Truth, Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender–Receiver Games*
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Publication:4683652
DOI10.1111/sjoe.12003zbMath1397.91118MaRDI QIDQ4683652
Ronald J. A. P. Peeters, Marc Vorsatz, Markus Walzl
Publication date: 21 September 2018
Published in: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/f68df75b-2b83-4197-a1e6-adcd6d3378b3
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