An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol

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Publication:4698451

DOI10.2307/2974850zbMath0824.90142OpenAlexW4243871993WikidataQ55892270 ScholiaQ55892270MaRDI QIDQ4698451

Alan D. Taylor, Steven J. Brams

Publication date: 4 May 1995

Published in: The American Mathematical Monthly (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2974850




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