DISCRETE TIME DYNAMIC GAMES WITH A CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS I: DECOMPOSABLE GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198902000732zbMath1029.91006OpenAlexW2478282081MaRDI QIDQ4795956

Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel

Publication date: 26 February 2003

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198902000732

zbMATH Keywords

electionsequilibriumdiscrete timedynamic gamecommon ecosystemcontinuum of players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

The tragedy of open ecosystems ⋮ On the terminal condition for the Bellman equation for dynamic optimization with an infinite horizon ⋮ Analysis of Markovian competitive situations using nonatomic games ⋮ Common resources, optimality and taxes in dynamic games with increasing number of players ⋮ Open and closed loop Nash equilibria in games with a continuum of players ⋮ DISCRETE TIME DYNAMIC GAMES WITH CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS II: SEMI-DECOMPOSABLE GAMES

Cites Work

• On a theorem of Schmeidler
• Bandwagon effects and two-party majority voting
• A unifying approach to existence of Nash equilibria
• Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
• A continuous time model of the bandwagon effect in collective action
• Existence of pure equilibria in games with nonatomic space of players

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