Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
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Publication:4834437
DOI10.2307/2118358zbMath0826.90035MaRDI QIDQ4834437
No author found.
Publication date: 30 May 1995
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w4480.pdf
91B14: Social choice
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