Informational Braess’ Paradox: The Effect of Information on Traffic Congestion
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Publication:4971386
DOI10.1287/opre.2017.1712zbMath1455.90030arXiv1601.02039MaRDI QIDQ4971386
Ali Makhdoumi, Daron Acemoglu, Asuman Ozdaglar, Azarakhsh Malekian
Publication date: 12 October 2020
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1601.02039
90B06: Transportation, logistics and supply chain management
90B10: Deterministic network models in operations research
90B20: Traffic problems in operations research
Related Items
Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games, The Value of Information in Selfish Routing, Unnamed Item, Social learning in nonatomic routing games, Epidemic spreading and equilibrium social distancing in heterogeneous networks, Robust perfect equilibrium in large games, A traffic congestion analysis by user equilibrium and system optimum with incomplete information, Modifying link capacity to avoid Braess paradox considering elastic demand
Uses Software
Cites Work
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