Crime, Intimidation, and Whistleblowing: A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4973592
DOI10.1093/restud/rdy075zbMath1425.91267WikidataQ128671816 ScholiaQ128671816MaRDI QIDQ4973592
Sylvain Chassang, Gerard Padró I. Miquel
Publication date: 28 November 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy075
inference; crime; policy evaluation; plausible deniability; intimidation; structural experiment design; whistleblowing
91B44: Economics of information
91C99: Social and behavioral sciences: general topics
91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory
Related Items
Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response, Crying about a strategic wolf: a theory of crime and warning, Mediated talk: an experiment