A Menu of Insurance Contracts for the Unemployed

DOI10.1093/restud/rdab026zbMath1484.91372OpenAlexW3125447364MaRDI QIDQ5064515

Regis Barnichon, Yanos Zylberberg

Publication date: 16 March 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab026

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardadverse selectionunemployment insurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial mathematics (91G05) Labor markets (91B39) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items (1)

Optimal entry decision of unemployment insurance under partial information

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