A tighter welfare guarantee for first-price auctions

DOI10.1145/3188745.3188944zbMath1430.91046arXiv1803.06707OpenAlexW2808926788MaRDI QIDQ5230283

Zihe Wang, Darrell Hoy, Samuel Taggart

Publication date: 22 August 2019

Published in: Proceedings of the 50th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.06707

zbMATH Keywords

first-price auctionBayes-Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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