A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium

DOI10.2307/2951784zbMath0778.90105OpenAlexW2156758485MaRDI QIDQ5289306

Joel Watson

Publication date: 22 August 1993

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951784

zbMATH Keywords

inferencerationalizabilityreputationStackelberg payoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

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