Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks
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Publication:5441624
DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2007.00766.XzbMath1142.91352OpenAlexW2070694319MaRDI QIDQ5441624
Alessandro Pavan, George-Marios Angeletos, Christian Hellwig
Publication date: 15 February 2008
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00766.x
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