A note on reactive equilibria in the discounted prisoner's dilemma and associated games (Q1112746)
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| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | A note on reactive equilibria in the discounted prisoner's dilemma and associated games |
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A note on reactive equilibria in the discounted prisoner's dilemma and associated games (English)
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1988
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It is shown that the Tit-for-Tat strategy (and also more general reactive strategies) in the standard repeated prisoners' dilemma is not a perfect equilibrium, except for certain special values of the discount factors.
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reactive equilibria
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Tit-for-Tat strategy
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reactive strategies
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repeated prisoners' dilemma
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perfect equilibrium
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