Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules

DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00499.xzbMath1130.91324MaRDI QIDQ5473020

Arunava Sen, Dipjyoti Majumdar

Publication date: 19 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00499.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

91B14: Social choice

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