Large Robust Games

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Publication:5475058


DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00549.xzbMath1141.91312MaRDI QIDQ5475058

Ehud Kalai

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00549.x


91A10: Noncooperative games


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