The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
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Publication:5477768
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00335zbMath1137.91339MaRDI QIDQ5477768
Publication date: 29 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00335
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B74: Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.)
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