Deliberation and Voting Rules

DOI10.1007/3-540-27295-X_11zbMath1255.91083MaRDI QIDQ5486933

Timothy Feddersen, David Austen-Smith

Publication date: 18 September 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (17)

First and second best voting rules in committees ⋮ Communication and bargaining in the spatial model ⋮ Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel ⋮ A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees ⋮ Lying for votes ⋮ Domains Admitting Ex Post IncentiveCompatible and Respectful Mechanisms: A Characterization for the Two-Alternative Case ⋮ Information acquisition and transparency in committees ⋮ Independent versus collective expertise ⋮ Communication compatible voting rules ⋮ Iterative deliberation via metric aggregation ⋮ Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent ⋮ Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers ⋮ Judgment aggregation in search for the truth ⋮ Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees ⋮ Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition ⋮ Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes ⋮ Social Choice Theory

This page was built for publication: Deliberation and Voting Rules