Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies

DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00669.xzbMath1145.91315MaRDI QIDQ5489085

Ichiro Obara, Michihiro Kandori

Publication date: 25 September 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00669.x

zbMATH Keywords

efficiency; repeated game; imperfect public monitoring; mixed strategy; partnership game; private equilibrium; private strategy; two-state machine

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

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