Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
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Publication:5631116
DOI10.1007/BF01934199zbMath0225.05002MaRDI QIDQ5631116
Leslie B. Wilson, D. G. McVitie
Publication date: 1970
Published in: BIT (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01934199
05A05: Permutations, words, matrices
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