A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
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Publication:5704116
DOI10.1287/moor.28.1.103.14256zbMath1082.90096MaRDI QIDQ5704116
Publication date: 11 November 2005
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/aff59c6a75541c63b50c897161a6d29ed8c04c83
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