A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2005.00339.XzbMath1121.91030MaRDI QIDQ5706646

Yoram Halevy, Vincent Feltkamp

Publication date: 21 November 2005

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

sufficient conditionsEllsberg paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

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