A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation

DOI10.2307/2298049zbMath0717.90005OpenAlexW2020503529MaRDI QIDQ5749127

Arunava Sen, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 1991

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298049

zbMATH Keywords

Nash-implementablenon- dictatorial and Pareto-efficient social choice correspondencestwo-person social choice correspondences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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