Theories of truth which have no standard models (Q5951912)

From MaRDI portal
Revision as of 08:56, 30 July 2024 by Openalex240730090724 (talk | contribs) (Set OpenAlex properties.)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1687428
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Theories of truth which have no standard models
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1687428

    Statements

    Theories of truth which have no standard models (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    29 August 2002
    0 references
    Authors like \textit{H. Friedman} and \textit{M. Sheard} [Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 33, 1-21 (1987; Zbl 0634.03058)] have classified type-free axiomatic theories of truth extending Peano arithmetic as consistent and inconsistent. Some of the theories proved to be consistent by Friedman and Sheard, however, turned out to be \(\omega\)-inconsistent [\textit{V. McGee}, J. Philos. Logic 14, 399-410 (1985; Zbl 0583.03002)] and therefore rated also as inacceptable like the inconsistent ones. Since then several further \(\omega\)-inconsistency results on axiomatic theories of truth have been obtained. E.g., \textit{A. Visser} [in: D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Vol. IV. Dordrecht: Reidel, Synth. Libr. 167, 617-706 (1989; Zbl 0869.03001)] proved that a very weak theory of ramified truth (namely the T-sentences) is \(\omega\)-inconsistent if the hierarchy of truth predicates is infinitely descending. \textit{S. Yablo} [Analysis, Oxf. 53, 251-252 (1993; Zbl 0943.03565)] provided another example of a system which is \(\omega\)-inconsistent though consistent. Leitgeb investigates how the different \(\omega\)-inconsistency results are related and he adds a further instance of such a result. His results reveal that there is a pattern underlying all known \(\omega\)-inconsistency phenomena. Most notably, Leitgeb shows how to reduce the \(\omega\)-inconsistency theorem on the Friedman-Sheard system FS [see \textit{V. Halbach}, Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 35, 311-327 (1994; Zbl 0828.03030)] to Visser's theorem and that McGee's theorem parallels Yablo's paradox. Leitgeb's new \(\omega\)-inconsistency result concerns the system \(\Phi\) given by the axioms of Robinson's arithmetic \(Q\), an axiom scheme assuring that the truth predicate Tr distributes over the conditional, the rules \(\frac{\phi}{\text{Tr}[\phi]}\), \(\frac{\text{Tr}[\phi]}{\phi}\), the ``Barcan formula'' \(\forall x\text{Tr}[\phi (\dot{x})]\rightarrow \text{Tr}[\forall x\phi(x)] \) and the axiom scheme \(\text{Tr} [\text{Tr} [\phi]]\rightarrow \text{Tr}[\phi]\).
    0 references
    axiomatic theories of truth
    0 references
    semantically closed languages
    0 references
    nonstandard models
    0 references
    \(\omega\)-logic
    0 references
    McGee's \(\omega\)-inconsistency result
    0 references

    Identifiers

    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references