Complementarity and diagonal dominance in discounted stochastic games (Q1854736)

This paper deals with discounted stochastic games characterized by monotonicity, supermodularity and diagonal dominance assumptions on the reward functions and the transition law. The scope and limitations of this class of games is discussed. The author provides a summary of the existence of a Markov-stationary equilibrium for the infinite horizon game proved by \textit{L. O. Curtat} [Games Econ. Behav. 17, 177-199 (1996; Zbl 0874.90210)] and establishes the uniqueness of Markov equilibrium and dominance solvability results of the finite horizon game. In both cases, the equilibrium strategies and the corresponding value functions are nondecreasing Lipschitz-continuous functions of the state vector. Some specific economic applications are also discussed. Finally, an appendix summarizes the main definitions and results from lattice programming invoked in this paper.