Truthful two-facility location with candidate locations

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-43254-5_21zbMATH Open1542.90146MaRDI QIDQ6546305FDOQ6546305

Author name not available (Why is that?), Alexandros A. Voudouris, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos

Publication date: 29 May 2024

zbMATH Keywords

approximationfacility locationmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Heterogeneous facility location without money
• Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks
• Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions
• Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks
• Constrained heterogeneous facility location games with max-variant cost
• Two-facility Location Games with Minimum Distance Requirement
• Strategyproof facility location for three agents on a circle
• Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions
• Approximate mechanism design for distributed facility location
• Mechanism design for facility location games with candidate locations
• Mechanism design for facility location with fractional preferences and minimum distance
• Obnoxious facility location games with candidate locations
• On Discrete Truthful Heterogeneous Two-Facility Location
• Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources

Cited In (3)

• On truthful constrained heterogeneous facility location with max-variant cost
• Constrained heterogeneous two-facility location games with sum-variant
• Truthful two-facility location with candidate locations

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