Pages that link to "Item:Q1196656"
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The following pages link to Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice (Q1196656):
Displaying 37 items.
- Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination (Q281391) (← links)
- Fully absorbing dynamic compromise (Q403722) (← links)
- How burning money requires a lot of rationality to be effective (Q433732) (← links)
- Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability (Q523027) (← links)
- A note on pre-play communication (Q523513) (← links)
- Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach (Q697929) (← links)
- Coordination through reputations: A laboratory experiment (Q700095) (← links)
- On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response (Q705862) (← links)
- Network architecture, salience and coordination (Q719877) (← links)
- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium (Q900143) (← links)
- Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example (Q909592) (← links)
- Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance (Q975372) (← links)
- Dynamic psychological games (Q1001812) (← links)
- Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games (Q1173868) (← links)
- Pricing and coordination: Strategically stable equilibria (Q1193753) (← links)
- Forward induction, public randomization, and admissibility (Q1276118) (← links)
- On the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite common payoffs games (Q1277709) (← links)
- Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction (Q1296383) (← links)
- Experience from a course in game theory: Pre- and postclass problem sets as a didactic device (Q1300679) (← links)
- Communication, risk, and efficiency in games (Q1384013) (← links)
- Admissibility and common belief. (Q1395583) (← links)
- Inefficient stage Nash is not stable (Q1622452) (← links)
- Is increasing inequality harmful? Experimental evidence (Q1691354) (← links)
- Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination (Q1756331) (← links)
- Individually rational pure strategies in large games (Q1885432) (← links)
- Limited focus in dynamic games (Q2002069) (← links)
- Resisting persuasion (Q2074039) (← links)
- Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly (Q2177802) (← links)
- On the strategic value of `shooting yourself in the foot': an experimental study of burning money (Q2178637) (← links)
- Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: an experimental study (Q2268106) (← links)
- The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game (Q2417363) (← links)
- Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction (Q2486154) (← links)
- Coordination via delay: theory and experiment (Q2681499) (← links)
- Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games (Q2685842) (← links)
- MONEY TALKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CHEAP TALK AND BURNED MONEY (Q5744894) (← links)
- Cautious belief and iterated admissibility (Q6146449) (← links)
- Pricing group membership (Q6173746) (← links)
