Pages that link to "Item:Q1276120"

The following pages link to Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations (Q1276120):

Displaying 21 items.

• Profit-maximizing matchmaker (Q417692) (← links)
• Decentralized job matching (Q532508) (← links)
• Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market (Q532688) (← links)
• Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games (Q548065) (← links)
• A generalized assignment game (Q854115) (← links)
• Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries (Q952773) (← links)
• Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability (Q1021616) (← links)
• The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets (Q1285523) (← links)
• Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. (Q1420524) (← links)
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems (Q1577962) (← links)
• A simple selling and buying procedure (Q1601457) (← links)
• Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching (Q1651221) (← links)
• Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem (Q1927736) (← links)
• Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium (Q2031196) (← links)
• The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically (Q2363424) (← links)
• One-to-many non-cooperative matching games (Q2376068) (← links)
• The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules (Q2482680) (← links)
• Decentralized matching: the role of commitment (Q2516226) (← links)
• Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
• Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (Q6107369) (← links)
• Sequential school choice with public and private schools (Q6624508) (← links)