Pages that link to "Item:Q1350573"

The following pages link to A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems (Q1350573):

Displaying 16 items.

• Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem (Q306741) (← links)
• Profit-maximizing matchmaker (Q417692) (← links)
• The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation (Q532676) (← links)
• Matching markets under (in)complete information (Q894021) (← links)
• Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money (Q896943) (← links)
• Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems (Q930486) (← links)
• Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities (Q999743) (← links)
• The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets (Q1285523) (← links)
• Games of manipulation in marriage problems (Q1369072) (← links)
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets (Q1381985) (← links)
• Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems. (Q1427493) (← links)
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals (Q1800965) (← links)
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431839) (← links)
• Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms (Q2569387) (← links)
• When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results (Q3394931) (← links)
• Dynamically stable matching (Q6059528) (← links)