Pages that link to "Item:Q1350873"

The following pages link to Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers (Q1350873):

Displaying 39 items.

• A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights (Q277315) (← links)
• An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders (Q495767) (← links)
• Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition (Q662274) (← links)
• Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization (Q715242) (← links)
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits (Q765207) (← links)
• A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints (Q765229) (← links)
• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions (Q896934) (← links)
• Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders (Q1029531) (← links)
• Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: Incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints (Q1300369) (← links)
• Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments (Q1627001) (← links)
• Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets (Q1668196) (← links)
• Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers (Q2031178) (← links)
• A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer (Q2190384) (← links)
• Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer (Q2212767) (← links)
• Contests with insurance (Q2218543) (← links)
• Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design (Q2253834) (← links)
• Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space (Q2290365) (← links)
• Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints (Q2318114) (← links)
• Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities (Q2346934) (← links)
• The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings (Q2351253) (← links)
• Endogenous budget constraints (Q2409712) (← links)
• Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents (Q2416630) (← links)
• Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences (Q2425157) (← links)
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers (Q2439904) (← links)
• On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints (Q2442845) (← links)
• Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints (Q2481947) (← links)
• Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions (Q2655643) (← links)
• Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions (Q3459303) (← links)
• A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design (Q4997317) (← links)
• Budget-Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions (Q5003721) (← links)
• Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms (Q5108230) (← links)
• Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment (Q5126629) (← links)
• Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach (Q5247609) (← links)
• Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms – Two players case (Q5283446) (← links)
• High bids and broke winners (Q5952426) (← links)
• Nonlinear pricing with budget constraint (Q5958458) (← links)
• Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility (Q6052992) (← links)
• Auction design for bidders with ex post ROI constraints (Q6609168) (← links)
• Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent (Q6642838) (← links)