The following pages link to Reinterpreting the kernel (Q1381978):
Displaying 16 items.
- Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem (Q417688) (← links)
- A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel (Q521886) (← links)
- Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games (Q857827) (← links)
- A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel (Q859597) (← links)
- Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value (Q928023) (← links)
- Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games (Q1128553) (← links)
- Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set (Q1277093) (← links)
- The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games (Q1581908) (← links)
- Bargaining with asymmetric threat points (Q1583412) (← links)
- Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: a strategic perspective (Q1735767) (← links)
- A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives (Q1753274) (← links)
- Bargaining and bargaining sets. (Q1864805) (← links)
- Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel. (Q1864827) (← links)
- Coalitional games with veto players: consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes (Q2384445) (← links)
- Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games (Q2491881) (← links)
- Signaling, screening, and core stability (Q6090450) (← links)