Pages that link to "Item:Q1381985"

The following pages link to Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets (Q1381985):

Displaying 40 items.

• Enrollment manipulations in school choice (Q268634) (← links)
• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801) (← links)
• An analysis of the German university admissions system (Q361830) (← links)
• Application fee manipulations in matching markets (Q393269) (← links)
• Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems (Q403704) (← links)
• On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets (Q404743) (← links)
• School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action (Q423742) (← links)
• Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching (Q485428) (← links)
• Optimal truncation in matching markets (Q485816) (← links)
• A further note on the college admission game (Q662278) (← links)
• Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket (Q836923) (← links)
• The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP) (Q972135) (← links)
• Manipulation via capacities revisited (Q980957) (← links)
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement (Q1283855) (← links)
• Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets? (Q1294009) (← links)
• Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching (Q1651221) (← links)
• Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility (Q1651280) (← links)
• Towards a fair distribution mechanism for asylum (Q1656973) (← links)
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (Q1762420) (← links)
• Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments (Q1867834) (← links)
• Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets (Q1984501) (← links)
• Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets (Q2021788) (← links)
• An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches (Q2049465) (← links)
• School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms (Q2051001) (← links)
• Incentives in landing slot problems (Q2359379) (← links)
• The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets (Q2376989) (← links)
• When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? (Q2402812) (← links)
• Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods (Q2406941) (← links)
• Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431838) (← links)
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431839) (← links)
• Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets (Q2437176) (← links)
• Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (Q2437801) (← links)
• Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (Q2437848) (← links)
• The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
• Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria (Q2453419) (← links)
• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets (Q2455677) (← links)
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (Q2482681) (← links)
• MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY (Q2854007) (← links)
• Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents (Q6076915) (← links)
• Subgame perfect coalition formation (Q6176201) (← links)