Pages that link to "Item:Q1420521"

The following pages link to The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions. (Q1420521):

Displaying 34 items.

• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective (Q320681) (← links)
• Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems (Q403704) (← links)
• False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives (Q403973) (← links)
• Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism (Q431213) (← links)
• Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions (Q543608) (← links)
• Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems (Q543619) (← links)
• Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting (Q616771) (← links)
• A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting (Q656886) (← links)
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions (Q834856) (← links)
• An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem (Q835835) (← links)
• Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information (Q844917) (← links)
• The complexity of deciding reachability properties of distributed negotiation schemes (Q924139) (← links)
• A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis (Q926233) (← links)
• Ex post implementation (Q932807) (← links)
• The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle (Q1001833) (← links)
• Path auctions with multiple edge ownership (Q1041251) (← links)
• Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing (Q1728405) (← links)
• Optimizing scrip systems: crashes, altruists, hoarders, sybils and collusion (Q1938377) (← links)
• Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing (Q2159522) (← links)
• An improved incentive ratio of the resource sharing on cycles (Q2326077) (← links)
• Agent incentives of a proportional sharing mechanism in resource sharing (Q2420658) (← links)
• Unfolding the mystery of false-name-proofness (Q2446284) (← links)
• Core-selecting package auctions (Q2482666) (← links)
• Diffusion auction design (Q2667812) (← links)
• A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments (Q3617024) (← links)
• Agent incentives of strategic behavior in resource exchange (Q5920216) (← links)
• Budget-feasible Sybil-proof mechanisms for crowdsensing (Q6111488) (← links)
• Budget-feasible Sybil-proof mechanisms for crowdsensing (Q6168078) (← links)
• Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles (Q6176732) (← links)
• Optimal Mechanism Design for Agents with DSL Strategies: The Case of Sybil Attacks in Combinatorial Auctions (Q6199613) (← links)
• Buy-many mechanisms for many unit-demand buyers (Q6609124) (← links)
• False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences (Q6611995) (← links)
• Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models (Q6664585) (← links)
• Tight incentive analysis of Sybil attacks against the market equilibrium of resource exchange over general networks (Q6665695) (← links)