Pages that link to "Item:Q1577962"
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The following pages link to Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems (Q1577962):
Displaying 26 items.
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets (Q485820) (← links)
- Decentralized job matching (Q532508) (← links)
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games (Q548065) (← links)
- In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm (Q705854) (← links)
- Decentralized college admissions under single application (Q826044) (← links)
- A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search (Q893408) (← links)
- Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems (Q930486) (← links)
- Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability (Q1021616) (← links)
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations (Q1276120) (← links)
- The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets (Q1285523) (← links)
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. (Q1420524) (← links)
- A simple selling and buying procedure (Q1601457) (← links)
- Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching (Q1651221) (← links)
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem (Q1927736) (← links)
- Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability (Q2013343) (← links)
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium (Q2031196) (← links)
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q2041080) (← links)
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab (Q2067353) (← links)
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431839) (← links)
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria (Q2453419) (← links)
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules (Q2482680) (← links)
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment (Q2516226) (← links)
- The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism (Q2675461) (← links)
- (Q5053286) (← links)
- Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (Q6107369) (← links)
