Pages that link to "Item:Q1622367"
From MaRDI portal
The following pages link to Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof (Q1622367):
Displaying 17 items.
- Automated optimal OSP mechanisms for set systems. The case of small domains (Q777956) (← links)
- Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match (Q1651286) (← links)
- Communication with evidence in the lab (Q1756334) (← links)
- Level-k reasoning in school choice (Q2031184) (← links)
- On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options (Q2126158) (← links)
- Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation (Q2147998) (← links)
- A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation (Q2212777) (← links)
- A stable marriage requires communication (Q2278950) (← links)
- Obvious manipulations (Q2288530) (← links)
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness (Q2295829) (← links)
- Approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms: the case of machine scheduling and facility location (Q2659777) (← links)
- Menu mechanisms (Q2675411) (← links)
- The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism (Q2675461) (← links)
- Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms (Q2682797) (← links)
- Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling. (Q5075789) (← links)
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof (Q6076917) (← links)
- Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences (Q6102576) (← links)
