Pages that link to "Item:Q1633670"
From MaRDI portal
The following pages link to Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application (Q1633670):
Displaying 13 items.
- Non-bossiness (Q682486) (← links)
- Influence in private-goods allocation (Q776963) (← links)
- How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field (Q2049478) (← links)
- Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem (Q2059097) (← links)
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices (Q2206002) (← links)
- Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching (Q2206800) (← links)
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants (Q2334138) (← links)
- School choice with preference rank classes (Q2681516) (← links)
- On Capacity-Filling and Substitutable Choice Rules (Q4958546) (← links)
- The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks (Q6053622) (← links)
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (Q6063102) (← links)
- A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem (Q6575517) (← links)
- Characterizing a probabilistic version of the Boston mechanism under weak priorities (Q6665050) (← links)
