Pages that link to "Item:Q1774815"
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The following pages link to When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts (Q1774815):
Displaying 15 items.
- A theory of political and economic cycles (Q406397) (← links)
- Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model (Q629322) (← links)
- A theory of political cycles (Q1017789) (← links)
- Optimal self-enforcement and termination (Q1734582) (← links)
- Dynamic contractual incentives in the face of a Samaritans's dilemma (Q1936337) (← links)
- Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs (Q1994202) (← links)
- Wealth effects and agency costs (Q2016213) (← links)
- Ambiguity in dynamic contracts (Q2067409) (← links)
- Optimal CEO turnover (Q2155243) (← links)
- Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover (Q2256986) (← links)
- Dynamic contracts with random monitoring (Q2283129) (← links)
- Attorney fees in repeated relationships (Q2326193) (← links)
- Outside opportunities and termination (Q2347777) (← links)
- Termination as an incentive device (Q6053658) (← links)
- FINANCING VENTURES (Q6067096) (← links)
