Pages that link to "Item:Q1863937"
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The following pages link to On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules (Q1863937):
Displayed 7 items.
- Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions (Q997202) (← links)
- How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election? (Q1887542) (← links)
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity (Q2385061) (← links)
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules (Q2385127) (← links)
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules (Q2432505) (← links)
- How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election (Q2500745) (← links)
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship (Q2641999) (← links)