Pages that link to "Item:Q1887542"
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The following pages link to How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election? (Q1887542):
Displaying 8 items.
- Is it ever safe to vote strategically? (Q404772) (← links)
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions (Q465694) (← links)
- Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem (Q835815) (← links)
- Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view (Q899165) (← links)
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis (Q2256718) (← links)
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey (Q2436695) (← links)
- How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election (Q2500745) (← links)
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation (Q5053694) (← links)
