Pages that link to "Item:Q1897309"
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The following pages link to Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance (Q1897309):
Displaying 16 items.
- Optimal contracting with dynastic altruism: family size and per capita consumption (Q405527) (← links)
- Public versus private risk sharing (Q548244) (← links)
- Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence (Q617686) (← links)
- Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model (Q629322) (← links)
- A dynamic model of unsecured credit (Q643266) (← links)
- Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement (Q694727) (← links)
- The dynamics of risk-sensitive allocations (Q813942) (← links)
- Credit and risk in rural developing economies (Q956517) (← links)
- Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information (Q1572944) (← links)
- Optimal self-financing microfinance contracts when borrowers have risk aversion and limited commitment (Q2222211) (← links)
- Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment (Q2323289) (← links)
- Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard (Q2455678) (← links)
- Default and aggregate income (Q2485956) (← links)
- EFFICIENCY–EQUALITY TRADE-OFF OF SOCIAL INSURANCE (Q3601587) (← links)
- Payments systems design in deterministic and private information environments (Q5947397) (← links)
- Termination as an incentive device (Q6053658) (← links)
