Pages that link to "Item:Q1920940"

The following pages link to Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems (Q1920940):

Displaying 45 items.

• Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem (Q306741) (← links)
• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801) (← links)
• Let them cheat! (Q423773) (← links)
• Decentralized job matching (Q532508) (← links)
• The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation (Q532676) (← links)
• Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games (Q548065) (← links)
• A further note on the college admission game (Q662278) (← links)
• Non-bossiness (Q682486) (← links)
• In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm (Q705854) (← links)
• Constrained school choice (Q840677) (← links)
• A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search (Q893408) (← links)
• Matching markets under (in)complete information (Q894021) (← links)
• Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market (Q894069) (← links)
• Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money (Q896943) (← links)
• Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems (Q930486) (← links)
• Manipulation via capacities revisited (Q980957) (← links)
• Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability (Q1021616) (← links)
• Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations (Q1276120) (← links)
• The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets (Q1285523) (← links)
• Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems (Q1296478) (← links)
• Implementation in generalized matching problems (Q1363086) (← links)
• Games of manipulation in marriage problems (Q1369072) (← links)
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets (Q1381985) (← links)
• Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. (Q1420524) (← links)
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems (Q1577962) (← links)
• A simple selling and buying procedure (Q1601457) (← links)
• Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching (Q1651221) (← links)
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications. (Q1867848) (← links)
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem (Q1995295) (← links)
• Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q2041080) (← links)
• School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms (Q2051001) (← links)
• Manipulability in school choice (Q2231403) (← links)
• Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism (Q2318116) (← links)
• On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals (Q2318132) (← links)
• The modified Boston mechanism (Q2334829) (← links)
• Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice (Q2362200) (← links)
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets (Q2431839) (← links)
• The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules (Q2482680) (← links)
• Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms (Q2569387) (← links)
• Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets (Q3748090) (← links)
• Two-Sided Matching Models (Q5150290) (← links)
• Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms (Q5881800) (← links)
• Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (Q6107369) (← links)
• Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students (Q6549826) (← links)
• Robustness to manipulations in school choice (Q6570723) (← links)