Pages that link to "Item:Q1939517"
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The following pages link to An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q1939517):
Displaying 19 items.
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics (Q290170) (← links)
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles (Q372362) (← links)
- New axioms for immediate acceptance (Q682464) (← links)
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process (Q682475) (← links)
- A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods (Q682480) (← links)
- Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets (Q826612) (← links)
- Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems (Q1671327) (← links)
- Serial dictatorship and unmatch reduction: a problem of Japan's nursery school choice (Q1672583) (← links)
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses (Q2222205) (← links)
- Matching with restricted trade (Q2329419) (← links)
- The modified Boston mechanism (Q2334829) (← links)
- New axioms for deferred acceptance (Q2397664) (← links)
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? (Q2402812) (← links)
- Making just school assignments (Q2516227) (← links)
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism (Q2637851) (← links)
- Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities (Q5247606) (← links)
- New axioms for top trading cycles (Q6066263) (← links)
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems (Q6188681) (← links)
- Reallocation with priorities (Q6188682) (← links)
