The following pages link to Persuasion with costly precision (Q2074047):
Displaying 8 items.
- Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender (Q503060) (← links)
- Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion (Q2074036) (← links)
- Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment (Q2074041) (← links)
- Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences (Q2074044) (← links)
- On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals (Q6063099) (← links)
- A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces (Q6156328) (← links)
- Testing under information manipulation (Q6559108) (← links)
- Signaling under double-crossing preferences: the case of discrete types (Q6615365) (← links)
