Pages that link to "Item:Q2253843"

The following pages link to Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions (Q2253843):

Displaying 20 items.

• On the stability of generalized second price auctions with budgets (Q315522) (← links)
• Assignment games with conflicts: robust price of anarchy and convergence results via semi-smoothness (Q503458) (← links)
• Welfare guarantees for proportional allocations (Q506519) (← links)
• The Pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design (Q777959) (← links)
• Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency (Q904682) (← links)
• Inefficiency of games with social context (Q904696) (← links)
• Generalized second price auctions over a network (Q1630505) (← links)
• A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints (Q1711420) (← links)
• Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids (Q1742153) (← links)
• Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction (Q2016248) (← links)
• Option values in sequential auctions with time-varying valuations (Q2021787) (← links)
• Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction (Q2061103) (← links)
• Introduction to computer science and economic theory (Q2253830) (← links)
• The price of anarchy for utilitarian scheduling games on related machines (Q2419358) (← links)
• Smoothness for Simultaneous Composition of Mechanisms with Admission (Q2959837) (← links)
• Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round (Q4991678) (← links)
• Game efficiency through linear programming duality (Q5090446) (← links)
• Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions (Q5219714) (← links)
• Equilibria of Greedy Combinatorial Auctions (Q5737806) (← links)
• On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions (Q5885597) (← links)