Pages that link to "Item:Q2273939"
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The following pages link to Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility (Q2273939):
Displaying 12 items.
- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice (Q2061119) (← links)
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab (Q2067353) (← links)
- Manipulability in school choice (Q2231403) (← links)
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement (Q2415985) (← links)
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option (Q2681500) (← links)
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible (Q5964686) (← links)
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (Q6063102) (← links)
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms (Q6074836) (← links)
- School choice with transferable student characteristics (Q6148575) (← links)
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources (Q6156321) (← links)
- School choice with costly information acquisition (Q6188680) (← links)
- Reallocation with priorities (Q6188682) (← links)
