Pages that link to "Item:Q2323297"
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The following pages link to Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications (Q2323297):
Displaying 10 items.
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets (Q1735744) (← links)
- Matching with property rights: an application to Korean teacher transfer program (Q2059096) (← links)
- Gradual college admission (Q2067380) (← links)
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment (Q2138086) (← links)
- Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited (Q2628708) (← links)
- The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism (Q2675461) (← links)
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible (Q5964686) (← links)
- Dynamically stable matching (Q6059528) (← links)
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (Q6063102) (← links)
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms (Q6074836) (← links)
