The following pages link to The modified Boston mechanism (Q2334829):
Displaying 18 items.
- Non-bossiness (Q682486) (← links)
- Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem (Q1995295) (← links)
- School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms (Q2051001) (← links)
- School choice in Guangzhou: why high-scoring students are protected? (Q2052523) (← links)
- Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem (Q2059097) (← links)
- Manipulability in school choice (Q2231403) (← links)
- Obvious manipulations (Q2288530) (← links)
- Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism (Q2318116) (← links)
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals (Q2318132) (← links)
- Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study (Q2416636) (← links)
- Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited (Q2628708) (← links)
- Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms (Q5881800) (← links)
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents (Q6076915) (← links)
- Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis (Q6084802) (← links)
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information (Q6090465) (← links)
- Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism (Q6156336) (← links)
- Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students (Q6549826) (← links)
- Robustness to manipulations in school choice (Q6570723) (← links)
