Pages that link to "Item:Q2367179"
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The following pages link to On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set (Q2367179):
Displaying 7 items.
- A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura) (Q422368) (← links)
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games (Q1289254) (← links)
- Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games (Q1371185) (← links)
- The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games (Q1742136) (← links)
- Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games (Q1814783) (← links)
- Social norms and core outcomes in a sharecropping economy (Q1897336) (← links)
- Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets (Q2502426) (← links)
