Pages that link to "Item:Q2385108"
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The following pages link to Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction (Q2385108):
Displaying 16 items.
- Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains (Q404745) (← links)
- Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity (Q427512) (← links)
- Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism (Q431213) (← links)
- An introduction to mechanized reasoning (Q504394) (← links)
- Non-bossiness (Q682486) (← links)
- Vickrey allocation rule with income effect (Q926207) (← links)
- Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects (Q2002068) (← links)
- Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains (Q2041075) (← links)
- Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions (Q2218556) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money (Q2259421) (← links)
- Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction (Q2385108) (← links)
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement (Q2415985) (← links)
- Joint misrepresentation with bribes (Q2634138) (← links)
- A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems (Q6074886) (← links)
- Ordinal allocation (Q6168818) (← links)
- Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems (Q6580468) (← links)
