Pages that link to "Item:Q2391249"

The following pages link to Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model (Q2391249):

Displaying 19 items.

• A continuous-time analysis of optimal restructuring of contracts with costly information disclosure (Q436947) (← links)
• Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach (Q900602) (← links)
• A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model (Q900607) (← links)
• Dynamic programming approach to principal-agent problems (Q1691442) (← links)
• A solvable dynamic principal-agent model with linear marginal productivity (Q1727153) (← links)
• A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem (Q1727286) (← links)
• Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns (Q1932540) (← links)
• Optimal contracting with effort and misvaluation (Q1938959) (← links)
• A continuous-time version of a delegated asset management problem (Q2217060) (← links)
• Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences (Q2348510) (← links)
• Dynamic contracts and learning by doing (Q2351399) (← links)
• Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting (Q2351400) (← links)
• The optimal solution to a principal-agent problem with unknown agent ability (Q2666679) (← links)
• Dynamic Contracting: Accidents Lead to Nonlinear Contracts (Q3195112) (← links)
• Mean-Field Leader-Follower Games with Terminal State Constraint (Q3300842) (← links)
• Contracting Theory with Competitive Interacting Agents (Q4631456) (← links)
• Dynamic optimal contract under parameter uncertainty with risk-averse agent and principal (Q4634215) (← links)
• Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks (Q6098176) (← links)
• Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies (Q6166333) (← links)