The following pages link to Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement (Q2415985):
Displaying 15 items.
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets (Q785541) (← links)
- Decentralized college admissions under single application (Q826044) (← links)
- Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets (Q826612) (← links)
- WARP and combinatorial choice (Q1693195) (← links)
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers (Q2049501) (← links)
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities (Q2051512) (← links)
- Essentially stable matchings (Q2178028) (← links)
- Obvious manipulations (Q2288530) (← links)
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option (Q2681500) (← links)
- School choice with preference rank classes (Q2681516) (← links)
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible (Q5964686) (← links)
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (Q6063102) (← links)
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms (Q6074836) (← links)
- School choice with transferable student characteristics (Q6148575) (← links)
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources (Q6156321) (← links)
