Pages that link to "Item:Q2437181"
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The following pages link to Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty (Q2437181):
Displaying 24 items.
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information (Q308649) (← links)
- Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents (Q472193) (← links)
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules (Q523473) (← links)
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide (Q1650274) (← links)
- Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents (Q1668496) (← links)
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies (Q1684127) (← links)
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents (Q1787988) (← links)
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals (Q1792573) (← links)
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals (Q1800965) (← links)
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information (Q2002347) (← links)
- Reaching consensus through approval bargaining (Q2013345) (← links)
- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents (Q2013373) (← links)
- Information disclosure with many alternatives (Q2068884) (← links)
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions (Q2100648) (← links)
- Promises and endogenous reneging costs (Q2173104) (← links)
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (Q2206010) (← links)
- Double implementation without no-veto-power (Q2334843) (← links)
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals (Q2343379) (← links)
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation (Q2417415) (← links)
- Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes (Q2439798) (← links)
- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information (Q2668986) (← links)
- Implementation with a sympathizer (Q2682027) (← links)
- On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition (Q2867517) (← links)
- Lying for votes (Q6148360) (← links)
