Pages that link to "Item:Q2437801"
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The following pages link to Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (Q2437801):
Displaying 14 items.
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems (Q403704) (← links)
- Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization (Q462853) (← links)
- Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources (Q900413) (← links)
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities (Q1691346) (← links)
- Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations (Q1996172) (← links)
- Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets (Q2021788) (← links)
- Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand (Q2036905) (← links)
- On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms (Q2060531) (← links)
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities (Q2078086) (← links)
- Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market (Q2100651) (← links)
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action? (Q2125094) (← links)
- Overlapping multiple object assignments (Q2358791) (← links)
- Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences (Q2425160) (← links)
- Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence (Q6077637) (← links)
